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ESSAY
LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
NAN D. HuNTER
It is an honor, albeit a sad one, to be invited to write this Essay in
commemoration of Tom Stoddard and as commentary on his final
publication.
I first met Tom in the late 1970s, when we both joined the Board
of Directors of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. Both
of us were American Civil Liberties Union staff attorneys, Tom for the
New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) and I for the Reproduc-
five Freedom Project in the national office. Later, for the last half of
the 1980s, Tom was the Executive Director of Lambda during the
same period that I was Director of the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights
and AIDS Projects. Much of my professional life has been spent in
tandem with Tom's, and his absence creates a giant gap in that world.
Not many of us are pioneers, but Tom Stoddard was. He fought
for equality for lesbian and gay Americans before it was respectable;
he was proudly out as a gay man before it was professionally safe to
be out; and he taught one of the first courses centering on the rights of
lesbians and gay men in any American law school. He lived to see the
lesbian and gay civil rights struggle take its place with others as a cam-
paign for human dignity and justice.
Tom's final Essay, Bleeding Heart Reflections on Using the Law
to Make Social Change,' is a reflection on the relationship between
litigation, legislation, and the possibilities for law to operate as "cul-
ture-shifting" rather than merely "rule-shifting." As with everything
Tom did, it is eloquent and engaging. Although I shall disagree with
some of his conclusions in this commentary, I want to point out first
the reasons why I accord particular respect to Tom's views on this
subject.
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks for comments, insights,
and support to Stacy Caplow, John D'Emilio, Lisa Duggan, Lani Guinier, Susan Herman,
Minna Kotkin, Bill Rubenstein, and Elizabeth Schneider, and for research assistance to
Marielle Berg. A special thanks to Walter Rieman, Tom Stoddard's spouse, not only for
inviting me to participate in this commemoration of Tom's work, but, more importantly,
for bringing deep love and great happiness to Tom's life.
1 Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967 (1997) [hereinafter Bleeding Heart].
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Tom was a master of both legislative advocacy and litigation. His
earliest public interest work was in the legislative arena. From 1977
until 1986, he served as Legislative Counsel and then-Legislative Di-
rector of the New York Civil Liberties Union. He also taught legisla-
tion courses, as well as sexual orientation law courses, at New York
University School of Law, his alma mater.
One of his major legislative achievements for the NYCLU is al-
luded to briefly and modestly in Bleeding Heart. Tom was instrumen-
tal in the enactment of the law that added sexual orientation to the
categories protected under New York City's Human Rights law.
When then-Mayor Ed Koch signed the legislation in 1985, he sent the
pen he used for the signing to Corporation Counsel Fritz Schwarz.
Schwarz sent the pen on to Tom, telling him that he was the one who
deserved it the most.
In 1986, Tom became Executive Director of Lambda Legal De-
fense and Education Fund and guided the explosive growth of that
organization from a one-room office in the ACLU building to the so-
phisticated law reform group that it now is. As the head of Lambda,
Tom oversaw an active litigation unit, which formed the core of
Lambda's work.2
One of the issues on which Tom was a leader was gay marriage.
He spoke out forcefully for its importance long before it became a
cause celebre. Seeking to promote discussion within the lesbian and
gay community about the pros and cons of prioritizing that issue, he
and then-Lambda Legal Director Paula Ettelbrick conducted debates
in several cities about whether litigation challenging the marriage laws
was a wise strategy. Those debates were a model not only of civility,
but of a thoughtful effort to democratize the discussion and the deci-
sioumaking before undertaking high stakes litigation.3
In 1993, the controversy over whether lesbian and gay Americans
should be allowed to serve openly in the armed forces erupted like a
volcano when incoming President Clinton announced his intention to
lift the ban. Tom was drafted by gay rights groups anxious to put for-
ward the best effort that the community could muster, and he ac-
cepted the post of Director of the Campaign for Military Service. In
that moment of political and legal crisis, all the realms of advocacy
(legislation, litigation, and administrative) that Tom discusses in
2 Lambda describes itself as "carry[ing] out its legal work principally through test cases
selected for the likelihood of their success in establishing positive legal precedents."
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, About Lambda (1997) (on file with author).
3 See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among
Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L.J. 1623, 1635-37
(1997).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
1010 [Vol. 72:1009
LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
Bleeding Heart converged with a force unequaled in the history of the
lesbian and gay rights movement. His role and his vantage point were
unique.
Perhaps my strongest memory of Tom is of a man of enormous
dignity. He embodied a mixture of thoughtfulness and principle that
one rarely sees in leaders in the public arena. Many persons inside
and outside of Lambda turned to him for advice and counsel through
the hectic days of the late 1980s, when hysteria about AIDS
threatened to trigger massive violations of civil liberties. Indeed, his
personal stature was so undeniable that his very presence in the move-
ment helped to give it dignity and stature as well.
In Bleeding Heart, Tom brings his life's experiences to bear on an
issue that is both enduring and compelling: how lawyering does or
does not advance movements for equality. Tom argues that reforms
won in the legislative arena, with their majoritarian imprimatur, are
more likely to lead to what he calls "culture-shifting," or the transfor-
mation of social norms, than are litigation victories. He advocates
that social change lawyers "upend our traditional preference for judi-
cial activity and embrace the special advantages of legislative
change."4 He closes by urging lawyers to give as much weight to the
dialogic process as to either of the two arenas per se, arguing that they
should prioritize work that will speak directly and forcefully to the
broader public 5
My commentary on these arguments has three parts. In Part I, I
argue that the litigation-legislative dynamic is more structurally com-
plicated than the description in Bleeding Heart suggests, and highly
contingent on the historical moment. For elaboration, I describe the
history of the women's law reform movement, perhaps the one most
closely parallel to the lesbian and gay rights movement in its historical
timing and context. In Part I, I will comment on what I think is one
of the most significant aspects of the Bleeding Heart argument: the
implicit assumption that lesbian and gay rights advocates have the po-
tential to regularly win in the legislative arena. Lastly, in Part III, I
offer some thoughts on how one can more consciously seek a culture-
shifting practice of law.
I
COMPLEXITY AND CONTINGENCY
I do not believe that as a general rule one can ascribe culture-
shifting moments to one arena-legislation or litigation-more than
4 Bleeding Heart, supra note 1, at 991.
5 See id.
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the other. Breakthrough moments in law occur rarely but not ran-
domly, regardless of arena. They usually follow long periods of incre-
mental, often nearly imperceptible, social change occurring at a glacial
pace. When they do occur, they crystallize what has gone before at
the same instant that they propel social structures forward. Law is
unique in that it has the power of coercion: it seeks to lock in the very
change that it signifies.
It is impossible to completely separate these arenas analytically,
for multiple reasons. I agree that majoritarian legislative victories can
be more politically stable than judicial interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, despite the fact that enactment of any statute is subject to nullifi-
cation by the process of judicial review. Note, however, that the
distinction between the arenas of change (legislative or judicial) is not
the same as the distinction between sources of law: statutory, or legis-
lature created, versus constitutional, or (mostly) judge created. Bleed-
ing Heart invokes as archetypes the enactment of a statute versus the
interpretation of the Constitution. In my view, however, the single
most common and powerful activity within social change lawyering
has become the use of litigation to secure enforcement and expansive
interpretation of statutes.
The primary example of a culture-shifting statute cited in Bleed-
ing Heart is the 1964 Civil Rights Act. At the time of its enactment,
the Civil Rights Act was culture-shifting for the South, but became so
nationally because of judicial interpretation primarily. Congress and
the public viewed the new statute as one that would end racial
apartheid, which most of the country saw as a problem of the South.
As the bill went through the legislative process, most public at-
tention focused on the sections dealing with voting, public accommo-
dations, and the authority of the Attorney General to enforce equal
protection of the laws. 6 The public accommodations section "was eas-
ily its most controversial provision, and arguably its most radically
transforming one for the South.'" 7 As a result of that portion of the
statute, "the destruction of Jim Crow in public accommodations
would occur with surprising speed and virtually self-executing final-
ity."8 The continuing nationwide impact of this statute thirty-five
years later, long after the end of de jure segregation, flows from such
judicial decisions as Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,9 in which the Court
6 See Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of Na-
tional Policy, 1960-1972, at 133 (1990).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 154.
9 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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interpreted the statute to reach widespread employment practices that
were facially neutral, but racially subordinating in their effects.
Although the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited sex as well as race
discrimination, it was not culture-shifting on the basis of sex. As
Bleeding Heart points out, the addition of "sex" to the prohibited ba-
ses for discrimination was a ploy to derail the bill by legislating for a
form of equality that its opponents thought would be viewed as
absurd.
Structural factors determine whether legislation or litigation
dominates an equality movement at any given moment: the roles of
the state and the market as allies or foes; the nature of the rights being
sought; and the broader political climate in each arena. The history of
women's rights law illustrates the complexity of this dynamic.
Although women began using the new statute immediately to
challenge employment exclusions, the culture-shifting moment in law
came in 1973, with the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.10
Like Brown v. Board of Education," Roe v. Wade was a challenge to
the power of the state, at the level of state law. Also like Brown, it
was a moment of high drama, not only because it culminated the ef-
forts of a major social protest movement, but also because in its wake
not a single state abortion statute remained constitutional.
Yet, the heyday of women's rights constitutional litigation was
stunningly short, especially when one examines equality doctrine,
rather than the privacy line of cases reflected in abortion litigation.
The test for challenges to sex-based classifications-whether the clas-
sification is substantially related to an important governmental inter-
est-was initially adopted in 197612 and reaffirmed last year.13 For
eleven years (1983-1994), the Supreme Court decided no cases on
Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination grounds. 14
What followed Roe, like what followed Brown, was the emer-
gence of statutory law as the dominant force in the field. By statutory
law, I mean both legislative enactment and litigation enforcement. In-
stead of a string of blockbuster test cases, a complex interrelationship
developed between actors and institutions in the field of women's
10 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
13 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). Opinions differ as to whether
the Court finetuned the intermediate scrutiny test by elaborating on certain aspects of it,
such as that the state's justification must be "exceedingly persuasive" and not generated
post hoc, or whether the test as so refined amounts to strict scrutiny without the Court
admitting it.
14 See Barbara Allen Babcock et al., Sex Discrimination and the Law: History, Prac-
tice and Theory 239-40 (2d ed. 1996).
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fights law. The issue of pregnancy discrimination provides a good ex-
ample. During the 1970s, test case litigation challenged exclusions of
pregnancy from public benefits programs on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, an issue that feminist advocates lost before the Supreme
Court when it ruled that discrimination between "pregnant persons
and non-pregnant persons" did not constitute discrimination based on
sex.15 Essentially the same claim litigated under Title VII produced
essentially the same reasoning and result.' 6 In response, advocates
sought and in 1978 achieved enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act17 (PDA), an amendment to Title VII. The adverse constitu-
tional decision remains good law.
The PDA in turn led to a generation of cases involving exclusions
of women workers from certain jobs (usually high paying) because of
asserted hazards to a fetus;' 8 and to the highly contentious question of
whether the PDA required employers to accord equal treatment, or
allowed them to accord special treatment, to pregnancy as a disability.
After the Supreme Court resolved that question,' 9 advocates sought
enactment of a mandate requiring that employers provide leave after
childbirth, a bill that was stalled by Presidential veto until 1993, when
the Family Medical Leave Act20 became law.
If one maps this story alongside the history of the African Ameri-
can civil fights movement, certain patterns emerge. The first is that a
shift away from primary reliance on constitutional litigation to secure
equality rights has already occurred. The current strategy of moving
rapidly between arenas raises new questions for advocates, equally
charged as those set forth in Bleeding Heart.
Other factors complicate any brightline distinction between legis-
lative and litigation arenas. Discursive communities arise in the inter-
stices of courts, legislatures, and enforcement agencies. The lawyers
and others who work in, and against, and back and forth between
these institutions create and disseminate understandings of the law
that then circulate in all those institutions and in the broader society.21
One extremely valuable function of litigation in a world of statu-
tory dominance is to preserve the outsider perspective as against the
insider, the Beltway player. Legislative and administrative advocacy
15 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
16 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
17 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)).
18 See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
19 See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
20 Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)).
21 See generally Harold A. MacDougal, Lawyering and the Public Interest in the 1990s,
60 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1991).
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requires one to seek the principled compromise. The litigation per-
spective is important both so that someone who has engaged with the
on-the-ground effects of law is able to bring her concerns to bear
when the principled compromise is being fashioned and because, later,
litigation challenging those compromises may be necessary to achieve
forward movement.
Second, both structural and historical contingencies powerfully
shape the social impact of lawmaking. Constitutional interpretation is
both more restricted and more powerful than legislation. It is re-
stricted in that constitutional issues are limited to the judicial branch
for their interpretation and to state action for their scope. As a result,
Congress can "fix" statutory interpretations that cut against equality,
as it did in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,-2 which it cannot do for
constitutional interpretations such as Geduldig v. Aiello.P- However,
the highly rationalized texts that emerge from such adjudications, as
contrasted with the often contorted structure of legislative codes, give
the courts' decisions far more rhetorical power and symbolic punch.
This structural fact coincided during the 1980s and early 1990s
with the historical accident that Congress was generally receptive to
equality claims 24 while the federal courts grew increasingly conserva-
tive. In 1976, the Court imposed an intent requirement for equal pro-
tection claims, s in effect eliminating most disparate impact claims
under the Constitution and making civil rights statutes a source of
stronger protection, even against state agencies, than the Constitution.
As Bleeding Heart notes, breakthrough moments require rein-
forcement to sustain cultural shifts,2 but that is true regardless of the
arena in which they occur. Reinforcement efforts often shift back and
forth between arenas, and there is no magic in moving from judicial
breakthrough to legislative reinforcement, or vice versa.
Third, and more deeply, women's rights law illustrates the impor-
tance of the roles of the state and market and the nature of the rights
being sought. Unlike in civil liberties cases, in women's rights work
the adversary is not usually the government; the government is often
an ally. The traditional civil liberties concern has been with the power
22 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
23 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
24 For example, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act in 1987 to "fix" the
narrowing construction of certain civil rights statutes that the Court announced in Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); the Fair Housing Amendments Act in 1988; the
Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990; and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, also to "fix" a
decision of the Court narrowing the scope of Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
25 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
26 See Bleeding Heart, supra note 1, at 986-87.
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of the state and abuses by the government. For women, the bigger
problem was often the absence of a remedy in the law to use in non-
governmental arenas, which the state traditionally recognized as pri-
vate. Women repeatedly sought to invoke state power against private
enclaves that lacked regulation.2 7 Thus, although this is something of
an overgeneralization, one can say that the thrust of women's rights
law reform in the last twenty years has been the enactment and imple-
mentation of (mostly) federal legislation and its application to non-
governmental structures, primarily the workplace and, to a lesser
extent, the family (e.g., child support and domestic violence laws).
Lastly, more imbedded structures and policies remain resistant to
women's rights claims. Barriers to full social equality for women to-
day are usually not explicitly sex-based but embody highly gendered
assumptions or stereotypes. Challenges to gendered structures-sex-
linked but not sex-determined28-can be difficult to fit into a classic
"based on sex" equality analysis.
Institutionally, the biggest difference in the location of successes
between lesbian and gay rights law and either race or sex equality law
has been vertical rather than horizontal, i.e., there has been much
greater activity at the state than at the federal level on sexual orienta-
tion issues, whether one examines either legislation or litigation. In
criminal law, the Supreme Court's decision upholding a sodomy stat-
ute in Bowers v. Hardwick29 sent lesbian and gay rights advocates to
state courts, where, using state constitutional grounds, there has been
striking success.3 0 In family law, the breakthroughs on marriage, 31
functional family recognition,32 and domestic partner benefits provi-
27 See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role
of Law, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 151, 154-57 (David Kairys ed., rev.
ed. 1990).
28 See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of
Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79,
138-49 (1989).
29 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
30 State courts in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Montana rejected the logic of Bowers v.
Hardwick to strike their own state sodomy laws in, respectively, Commonwealth v. Was-
son, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1996); and Gryczan v. State, No. 96-202, 1997 WL 370249 (Mont. July 2, 1997).
31 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
32 Binding legal recognition of family relationships between same-sex partners has been
most common in second parent adoption cases. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662
A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re B.L.V.B. &
E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). More generally, see In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (according guardianship status to lesbian partner); Brascli v. Stahl
Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (finding gay male couple to fall within definition of
"family" for rent control regulation purposes).
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sions33 have all occurred at the state or local level. And for employ-
ment and public accommodations, virtually the only successes have
occurred at the state level? 4
II
PARIAHS No MomE?
One of the most controversial arguments in Bleeding Heart is im-
plicit: underlying a call for a shift to prioritizing legislative strategy is
the belief that gay equality claims can be achieved, with a regular if
not inevitable degree of success, by majoritarian means. This is a pro-
vocative premise.
Until now, advocates for lesbian and gay rights have asserted that
homosexual citizens meet the indicia for political powerlessness asso-
dated with the requisite criteria for recognition as a suspect class in
equal protection law.35 Indeed, advocates have argued that lesbians
and gay men often constitute "pariahs" in the pluralist bazaar, invok-
ing Bruce Ackerman's description of groups so stigmatized that the
ordinary give and take of coalition politics cannot afford them a fair
opportunity to protect their interests. 36 Bleeding Heart does not relin-
quish that claim, but it does raise the question of whether a group that
can function effectively in the normal political process can invoke a
suspectness claim based on process failure.
There are signs that opponents of equality are finding increased
difficulties in using anti-gay electoral strategies. Indeed, perhaps the
most significant, least noticed, aspect of the controversy surrounding
the Colorado anti-gay initiative, declared unconstitutional by the
33 See generally Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union:
A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 Colum. L Rev. 1164
(1992).
34 Eleven states and the District of Columbia have adopted statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.1 (West Supp.
1997) (employment); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 46a-81c to -81d (West 1995) (employment
and public accomodations); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-2512 to -2519 (1981) (same); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 378-2 (1993) (employment); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 4552-53 (West 1997) (em-
ployment and public accomodations); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996)
(employment); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03 (West 1991) (employment and public accomoda-
tions); NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-4, -12 (West 1993) (employment and public accomodations);
1II. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-1 to -3 (1995) (employment); Vt Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 961(6) (1995)
(same); id. tit. 21 §§ 495(a), 1726(a)(7) (Supp. 1996) (same); Wis. Stat § 106.04 (Supp.
1997) (housing and public accomodations discrimination); H.B. 421, Regular Sess. (N.H.
1997) (approved June 9, 1997; effective Jan. 1, 1998) (employment and public
accomodations).
35 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1988),
vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
36 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L Rev. 713, 732
(1985).
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Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,37 was how atypical it was. Most
anti-gay voter initiatives in the 1990s have been defeated at the polls
or have failed to obtain the necessary number of signatures to qualify
for placement on the ballot; the Colorado provision was an excep-
tion.38 One can contrast that to the late 1970s, when a wave of newly
enacted civil rights provisions were repealed by popular vote.3 9
The obvious response is that advocates for lesbian and gay equal-
ity have made enormous strides, but this success is fragile and highly
uneven. The most stunning variation is geographic: laws guarantee-
ing equal rights for sexual minorities have become standard in urban
settings, but are still atypical in states that are not highly urbanized. A
recent study comparing cities with gay rights ordinances to all cities
found a stark breakdown by size of city:
Table 140
U.S. Cities with Gay Rights Laws, by Size of City
Population % of % of cities
all cities with rights laws
< 25,000 83.2 0.2
25,000 - 49,999 9.4 2.8
50,000 - 99,999 4.7 5.9
100,000 - 249,999 1.8 13.7
250,000 - 499,999 0.6 42.5
500,000 - 1,000,000 0.2 56.3
> 1,000,000 0.1 75.0
The need for heightened scrutiny remains strong in most situations,
but it may be that the lesbian and gay rights claim of a systematic
political process breakdown, such as to trigger heightened scrutiny, is
no longer viable in certain local jurisdictions.
37 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
38 Of the five statewide anti-gay ballot initiatives that have gone to voters during or
since the 1992 election, only one-Colorado's-won a majority. See Human Rights Cam-
paign, No Statewide Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives to Appear in November (last modified
July 6, 1996) <http'//www.qrd.org/qrd/orgs/HRC/no.statewide.antigay.inits-07.02.96>. In
addition, an initiative in Florida was kept off the ballot on the ground that it violated the
state's "single subject" rule. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen., 632 So. 2d
1018, 1019 (Fla. 1994). See generally Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 11, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 18.
39 See James W. Button et at., Private Lives, Public Conflicts: Battles over Gay Rights
in American Communities 68-69 (1997). In 1977, for example, voters eliminated civil rights
protections in Dade County, Florida; St. Paul, Minnesota; Wichita, Kansas; and Eugene,
Oregon, in rapid succession. See id.
40 See id. at 78 tbl.3-1.
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Some rights advocates would go considerably further.
Representative Barney Frank has described the United States as "a
country that is much less homophobic than it thinks it's supposed to
be. It is more racist than it's willing to admit, and less homophobic." 41
Frank analogizes anti-gay animus to anti-Semitism, rather than the
socially more difficult issue of racism:
As we've defeated anti-Semitism, I think we're in the process of
defeating homophobia. [I]f I'm right on the question of
homophobia, that's very relevant for our political tactics, because I
think it is now overwhelmingly clear that we should, in the political
arena, and in the litigation arena, behave just like everybody else.42
If sexual orientation discrimination were only about sexual orien-
tation, I might agree with Representative Frank's optimism. In my
view, however, it is at bottom about gender and anxiety about gender
deviance. That set of issues is comparable in its intractability to race,
as the women's equality movement has learned.
m
Ti FrFTH DIMENSION
If I am right that historical contingency-rather than intrinsic in-
stitutional characteristics-determines whether litigation or legislation
is more likely to be culture-shifting, we are still left with the New Zea-
land dilemma posed in Bleeding Heart. Why did the achievement of
legal equality there (apparently mostly by legislation) seem to lead to
so little social equality?
Tom posits four criteria for when rule-shifting becomes culture-
shifting: a genuinely significant change in the law; public conscious-
ness of the change and its impact; a sense of legitimacy behind the new
law; and continuous enforcement. I have no quarrel with any of these,
but I think a fifth necessary ingredient is missing: public engagement.
By engagement, I mean more than consciousness and more than pas-
sive support, even legitimacy. Unless there is significant public en-
gagement in some form, beyond a small cadre of litigators or
lobbyists, in the effort to change the law, there is no basis for culture-
shifting.
Let us assume arguendo that Bleeding Heart accurately describes
the situation for lesbians and gay men in New Zealand, where few feel
comfortable enough to be out despite ample legal protection. It is
quite possible that all four of these criteria could have been met in the
41 Barney Frank, Bowers + Ten: Litigation, Legislation, and Community Activism, 32
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 265,267 (1997).
42 Id.
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enactment of a nationwide law banning discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation and that this law is indeed being enforced, or would be
if citizens sought enforcement. Consider by contrast the examples of
culture-shifting laws in Bleeding Heart and in this Response: the 1964
Civil Rights Act, Roe v. Wade, the 1986 New York City lesbian and
gay rights ordinance, and the anti-smoking law in New York (but not
Paris). Each grew from a base of mobilized public demand, whether
litigation or legislation, whether federal or local, whether about equal-
ity or public health. On this view, it is no surprise that the 1964 Civil
Rights Act did have an immediate culture-shifting impact on race re-
lations, which was the constituency concern from which it grew, and
did not as to sex discrimination, which at that time had no comparable
social movement base.
In my view, the lesser degree of legitimacy that Bleeding Heart
ascribes to judge made rather than legislative decisions is better cap-
tured by the distinction between an engaged constituency and a pas-
sive audience. Consider the Massachusetts gay rights bill, enacted in
1989, and skillfully managed by legislative advocates who sought to
minimize public awareness of or involvement in the legislative de-
bates.43 The strategy worked and may have been necessary to achieve
victory, but its price was that "[t]he impact of the struggle to enact the
Bill on a cultural level was virtually nonexistent.""
I would change the injunction in Bleeding Heart to prioritize leg-
islative work into one to use any arena for lawyering also as a vehicle
for mobilization. Both legislative and litigation arenas have the po-
tential to mobilize and demobilize by empowering those who seek
legal assistance or by imposing the role of passive client onto persons
who were initially engaged. Both arenas reward repeat players.45 In
the realm of public interest and civil rights law, one goal should be
consciously using one's legal skills to strengthen the constituency or
community organization one represents, to make them more effective
as repeat players.
For a social justice lawyer, repeat clients are groups of people
active in the relevant community (which may be an issue constituency
or an identity group or a geographic community) who regularly con-
front hostile policies. They may be repeat clients for litigation work
or legislative advocacy or, more likely, for a mixture of both. Because
43 See Peter M. Cicchino et al., Comment, Sex, Lies, and Civil Rights: A Critical His-
tory of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 549 (1991).
44 Id. at 621.
45 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974) (developing concept of "repeat players" in
litigation).
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they seek equality as a social result, rather than solely reform of the
law, they are not constrained by doctrinal thinking. If such a group is
unconcerned or dismissive of the importance of law, there is little ba-
sis for a synergistic linkage. But if law figures prominently, if not pre-
dominately, in a group's approach, the lawyer who links with such a
group has the best opportunity to use law as a conscious culture-shift-
ing strategy.
At issue here is not a split between arenas for lavmaaking but
between models of social justice lawyering. The two major American
models have been doctrinal development and client advocacy, one
emphasizing the achievement of a certain new principle of law, the
other undertaking to serve the legal needs of some defined group.
The classic First Amendment test case strategy undertaken by the
American Civil Liberties Union illustrates the former, and the in-
house organizational lawyer epitomizes the latter (e.g., labor union
lawyers). Community legal services offices fall somewhere between,
often beginning as the latter but shifting to the former as budget re-
ductions force greater prioritization of impact litigation. Many orga-
nizations have developed hybrids. Some in-house legal units function
as both corporate counsel and law reform units (e.g., Planned
Parenthood Federation of America), while others perform legal serv-
ices and law reform work, leaving organizational legal matters to re-
tained counsel (e.g., Gay Men's Health Crisis). A number of stand
alone test case groups develop ongoing relations with client groups
whom they repeatedly represent (e.g., the ACLU Reproductive Free-
dom Project and the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy).
My concern is not with declaring one specific format to be the
correct one, but with the trend of law reform (litigation and lobbying)
groups proliferating without linkages to non-law defined groups.
Consider the historical progression from the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund (LDF), which began as a part of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, then separated for tax and orga-
nizational reasons,4 6 to the NOW Legal Defense Fund, which, learn-
ing the lessons of the NAACP LDF's history, began in tandem with,
but always separate from, the National Organization for Women; to
the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, which began solely
as a law reform group and never had an organizational affiliation with
a national political group. Lambda's stand alone origin was a develop-
ment quite representative of the time in which it was formed (1973),
the glory days for judicial breakthrough cases in the Supreme Court.
46 See Mark V. T1ushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy against Segregated Education,
1925-1950, at 98-100 (1987).
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A new literature on "critical lawyering," deriving primarily from
clinical law teachers, emphasizes linkages to organized client groups
among its other precepts.47 This literature and Bleeding Heart need to
be read together. Both are incomplete. In my view, the engagement
principle is the most important predictor of culture-shifting. The criti-
cal lawyering literature concurs on that point, but is virtually mute on
lawyering in the legislative realm. To critical lawyers, Bleeding Heart
should serve as a powerful reminder that such an oversight reflects
and helps to perpetuate a long outdated understanding of the full pa-
rameters of social justice law.
47 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection:
The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 Ecology L.Q. 619 (1992); Louise G. Trubek,
Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 415
(1996); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 535 (1987-1988); Eric K. Yamamoto,
Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights
America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 821 (1997).
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